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INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court laid out in Batson v.
Kentucky a three-step process for determining if racial discrimination
has occurred during jury selection.2 Since then, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has reviewed sixty-one Batson claims on direct appeal
from capital convictions,3 yet not once has it found a Batson
violation.4 In three cases, the court found reversible procedural
1. Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El I1), 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005) (quoting Miller-El
v. Cockrell (Miller-El1), 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)).
2. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986). Batson's three-step process
requires the objecting party to make a prima facie showing of discrimination, at which
point the burden shifts to the other party to show that its reasons for a peremptory
challenge are race-neutral. Finally, the trial court must determine whether racial
discrimination has in fact occurred. For further discussion of the three-step process
announced in Batson, see infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
3. This figure includes cases of three capital defendants whose appeals were heard
twice, two because the Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded for procedural Batson
error during their first appeal, and when the trial court denied relief on remand, they
appealed again. See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. The third was heard twice
because on the first direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded on
other grounds. See State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 35, 409 S.E.2d 288, 308 (1991)
(remanding case for resentencing because the trial court gave improper jury instructions).
This figure also includes two separate appeals of the same defendant for two separate
convictions of capital murder. State v. Smith, 352 N.C. 531, 532 S.E.2d 773 (2000)
(conviction for murder of Kelli Froemke); State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 496 S.E.2d 357
(1998) (conviction for murder of David Cotton). For a thorough discussion of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's Batson jurisprudence in capital cases up through 2004,
see ROBERT L. FARB, NORTH CAROLINA CAPITAL CASE LAW HANDBOOK 91-96 (2004).
4. This Recent Development will focus only on capital cases. There are two reasons
for this particular focus. The first is practical, in that it reasonably limits the scope of the
research while still providing a significant representative sample of cases, especially given
the limited criminal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of North Carolina (which hears as a
matter of right only death penalty cases, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a) (2005), or cases
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Batson errors5 but has never granted substantive Batson relief.6 In

two of those cases that were reversed for procedural errors (the third
case is still pending),7 after new Batson hearings, neither trial court
found a Batson violation.' Only one of these defendants raised his
Batson claim again on appeal, and he was ultimately denied relief.9 In
a half-page conclusory opinion in State v. Hoffman, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina stated:
The trial court concluded that the State had offered valid, race-

neutral

explanations

for

its

peremptory

challenges

of

prospective jurors ... and that defendant had failed to meet his

ultimate burden of proof of showing purposeful racial
discrimination in the challenging of these prospective jurors.
The transcript contains evidence that supports the trial court's
findings, and the findings in turn support its conclusions. This
assignment of error is therefore overruled .... 10

from the Court of Appeals in which there was a dissent, see id. § 7A-30(2)). Review of
most other criminal cases is discretionary. See id. § 7A-27(b) (appeal as of right of all
other judgments lies in the Court of Appeals); id. § 7A-31 (Supreme Court may, in its
discretion, grant review of decisions of the Court of Appeals). The second, more
important reason is substantive and deals with the significant difference in death as a
punishment than any other kind of sanction. For more discussion of "death is different"
jurisprudence and its implications in the Miller-El II decision, see infra notes 80-89 and
accompanying text.
5. See State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 344, 572 S.E.2d 108, 127-28 (2002) (holding that
the trial court erred in not finding a prima facie case of discrimination where the
prosecutor challenged five out of seven Black jurors, for an acceptance rate of only
28.6%); State v. Hoffman, 348 N.C. 548, 553-54, 500 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1998) (holding that
the trial court erred in not finding a prima facie case of discrimination where prosecutor
had excluded every Black juror not excused for cause and attempted to exclude another
Black juror from the twelfth seat on an all-White jury); State v. Green, 324 N.C. 238, 240,
376 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in denying defendant the
right to present evidence to rebut state's proffered race-neutral reasons for its peremptory
challenges of Black jurors). For more discussion about Batson's three-step process, see
infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
6. There is evidence that the Supreme Court of North Carolina performs no better in
noncapital cases. In the five years after the Batson decision, neither the Supreme Court of
North Carolina nor the North Carolina Court of Appeals ever granted substantive relief to
any defendant on a Batson claim. See Paul H. Schwartz, Comment, Equal Protection in
Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina,69 N.C. L.
REV. 1533, 1535 (1991).
7. Barden's case is too new to have been raised again on appeal. Barden, 356 N.C.
316, 572 S.E.2d 108.
8. See Hoffman, 349 N.C. at 173, 505 S.E.2d at 84; Green, 336 N.C. at 153, 443 S.E.2d
at 21. Green did not raise his Batson claim again.
9. See Hoffman, 349 N.C. at 173,505 S.E.2d at 84.
10. Id.
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This type of deference, without much further inquiry, to the trial
court's findings characterizes the vast majority of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina's reviews of capital Batson claims.1 It is this very
sort of deference for which the United States Supreme Court
admonished the Fifth Circuit in its recent decision in Miller-El v.
Dretke ("Miller-El I").12

In a six-three opinion, and without announcing any new law, the
Supreme Court suggested new contours for the level of scrutiny that
should be applied to Batson claims, finally granting relief to capital
defendant Thomas Miller-El, who had been denied such by seven
state and six federal judges over the course of eighteen years.13 The
majority delved deep into a factual review of Miller-El's evidence
showing that the prosecution discriminated against Black jurors when
exercising peremptory challenges during jury selection at his trial. 4
This Recent Development explores the new contours provided by the
United States Supreme Court, the rationale behind them, and what
impact, if any, they might have on the Supreme Court of North
Carolina's review of Batson claims in capital appeals. First, this
Recent Development briefly discusses the history of United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of racial discrimination in
jury selection. It then explores that Court's decision in Miller-El II,
the rationale behind it, and the Court's suggested approach to Batson
review in capital cases to provide for a more searching and honest
inquiry into possible racial discrimination.
Next, this Recent
Development analyzes how the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
rejected this same approach in its Batson review in capital cases for
two decades, thereby denying relief to every defendant that has
brought a Batson claim. Finally, this Recent Development argues
that the Supreme Court of North Carolina should conform its Batson
jurisprudence to the approach suggested in Miller-El H.

11. The rare exceptions are noted above, where the court found flaws only in the trial
courts' process for determining whether a Batson violation occurred. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
12. 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).
13. Id. at 2344 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
14. See id. at 2325-40 (majority opinion).
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I. RACE AND THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE: BATSON'S (FAILED?)
EXPERIMENT

Racial stereotyping has pervaded the selection of juries in this
nation for many decades. 5 After the United States Supreme Court
held in 1880 that it was an equal protection violation to exclude Black
men from being called to jury service, 6 the use of the peremptory
challenge became a primary tool for attorneys seeking to keep Black
citizens off juries. 7 Peremptory challenges have a long and checkered

history in American courts.1 8 Historically, the peremptory challenge
has been seen as a tool to level the playing field at trials, allowing
parties to exclude jurors whom they fear, for whatever reason, will be
partial to the opposing side.19 However, the very nature of the
peremptory challenge leaves it susceptible to abuse via racial, ethnic,

gender, and other kinds of discrimination.2 °
In Swain v. Alabama21 in 1965, the United States Supreme Court

held that while Black defendants have no right to a jury composed in
full or in part of members of their own race, a state violates the Equal
Protection Clause when it deliberately excludes jurors on the basis of
race.2 2 However, in order to raise a prima facie case of discrimination
in the jury selection process, Swain required that the defendant show
of peremptory challenges against
"the prosecutor's systematic use
' 23
Negroes over a period of time.

15. See Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S.CAL. L. REV. 235,
235-36 (1968). Kuhn traces this history back to the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which made
it a crime to discriminate on the basis of race in jury selection. Id. at 235.
16. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,310 (1880).
17. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103-04 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(suggesting that when it became illegal to bar Blacks from jury service, "[s]tate officials
then turned to [peremptory challenges as] somewhat more subtle ways of keeping Blacks
off jury venires").
18. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 213-21 (1965) (discussing the roots in English
common law of peremptory challenges and the role of the peremptory challenge in
American jury selection).
19. Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 157 (2005) ("At least in theory, [the peremptory
challenge] helps ensure both the reality and perception of an impartial jury and thus a fair
trial.").
20. Id. at 160; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 ("The reality of practice, amply reflected
in many state- and federal-court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and
unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate against Black jurors.").
21. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
22. Id. at 203-04.
23. Id. at 227.
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Two decades later, the Court developed a new test for
discrimination in Batson v. Kentucky,24 stating that the standard set

out in Swain "placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof,"
leaving "prosecutors' peremptory challenges ... largely immune from

constitutional scrutiny. 2' 5 To lessen this burden, the Court held in
Batson that to make a prima facie showing of discrimination in jury
selection, a defendant could rely solely on the relevant facts

surrounding the behavior of the prosecutor in the defendant's own
trial.26 The prima facie case is the first step in Batson's three-step

process. After the defendant raises an inference of discrimination,
the burden shifts to the prosecutor to rebut the prima facie case by
providing a "neutral explanation related to the particular case to be

tried. '27 The prosecutor's reasons do not have to be enough for a
challenge for cause but neither may they be a general denial of bad
faith nor an assertion that the juror might be biased toward a
defendant of the same race.28 Once the state provides its reasons for
challenging the jurors, the trial court must determine whether
24. Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
25. Id. at 92-93. Batson was convicted of second-degree burglary by an all-White jury
after the prosecutor peremptorily challenged all four Black jurors from the venire. Id. at
82-83.
26. Id. at 95. In order to make a prima facie case, a defendant must show that he is a
member of a "cognizable racial group," that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to
exclude members of that group from the jury, and that the relevant facts and
circumstances raise an inference of discrimination. Id. at 96. Furthermore, the defendant
is "entitled to rely on the fact ... that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' " Id.
(quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
27. Id. at 98.
28. Id. at 97-98. For example, if a prospective juror states that she is unequivocally.
opposed to the death penalty and would never vote for it in any circumstances, such a
person would be a good candidate for a challenge for cause. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1212(8) (2005) (stating that a challenge for cause may be made on the grounds that "[a]s a
matter of conscience, regardless of the facts and circumstances, [the prospective juror]
would be unable to render a verdict with respect to the charge in accordance with the law
of North Carolina"); RONALD M. PRICE, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE
§ 18-10 (4th ed. 1994) ("The trial court is permitted to excuse for cause a potential juror in
capital cases if his views on capital punishment . .. would prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath.").
On the other hand, if a prospective juror expresses reluctance about the death penalty, but
upon questioning by the attorneys or the judge, makes clear that she would be able to
follow the law, the prosecutor would not succeed on a challenge for cause but still might
want to excuse the juror with a peremptory challenge. This would be an acceptable "raceneutral" reason for a peremptory challenge. See, e.g., State v. Lyons, 343 N.C. 1, 13, 468
S.E.2d. 204, 209 (1996) (holding that prosecutor's belief that a prospective juror "was not
unequivocal in her ability to impose the death penalty" was not enough to "justify an
excusal for cause" but was a "clear, reasonably specific [reason] and related to the
particular case to be tried" and therefore acceptable grounds for a peremptory challenge).
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deliberate racial discrimination occurred. 29 Unfortunately, the Batson

Court gave little guidance as to how to make such a determination,30
instead placing its trust in the trial judges to do so." The Court
further stated, in a footnote, that these determinations, dependent
upon a trial judge's evaluation of the prosecutor's credibility, would
be entitled to "great deference" by reviewing courts.32
The great difficulty, as Justice Marshall noted in his Batson

concurrence, is how to determine whether a prosecutor's given
reasons are truly race-neutral or are merely pretextual and disguising

a race-based motive:
How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck
a juror because the juror had a son about the same age as
defendant, or seemed "uncommunicative," or "never cracked a
smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities
necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts

in this case."
If such easily generated explanations are
sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his
strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the
Court today may be illusory.33

To make matters worse, two later decisions made it even easier
for prosecutors to rebut a prima facie case by focusing the inquiry on
whether the state's proffered reason is facially race-neutral, even if, in
effect, it disproportionately excludes a particular racial group3 4 or is

not related to the particular case for which the jury is being selected.35
The first of these decisions was a plurality opinion, and the second a

29. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
30. Id. at 99 n.24 ("In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our
state and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best to
implement our holding today.").
31. Id. at 99 n.22 ("Certainly, this Court may assume that trial judges, in supervising
voir dire in light of our decision today, will be alert to identify a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination.").
32. Id. at 98 n.21.
33. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
34. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion) (stating
that exclusion of jurors based on Spanish-language preference is not race-related, as long
as the prosecutor's stated reason is concern that the jurors will not accept the official
translation by the court interpreter).
35. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that a strike
because a juror has "unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard-is race neutral and satisfies
the prosecution's step two burden"). The Court stated, "What [Batson] means by a
'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal
protection." Id.
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short per curiam opinion, demonstrating that the justices themselves
were perhaps perplexed, or frustrated, with Batson's application.3 6
Batson's progeny effectively
rendered Batson almost
meaningless: as Justice Marshall recognized in Batson, if a prosecutor
need only some race-neutral reason to justify her challenge, it is not
difficult to find one, and even less difficult for a judge to accept it as
valid.37 Couple the simplicity of producing and accepting "raceneutral" reasons with the great deference that Batson says is to be
afforded to trial courts, and it is little wonder that, in sixty-one
opportunities, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has not once
38
held that a trial court erred in finding no Batson violation.
II. MILLER-EL: A CALL TO ACTION
In the preface to its opinion in Miller-El H, the United States
Supreme Court itself recognized the chink in Batson's armor: the
Court noted, "Batson's individualized focus came with a weakness of
its own owing to its very emphasis on the particular reasons a
prosecutor might give. If any facially neutral reason sufficed to
answer a Batson challenge, then Batson would not amount to much
more than Swain."3 9 The Court's opinion in Miller-El II goes against

36. See Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failure
To Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 WIs. L. REV. 501, 528
n.152 (discussing that some commentators saw the per curiam opinion in Purkett as an
opportunity for the Court to pass on the Batson issue for the time being). Lower courts
also struggled mightily with the implementation of Batson. See Jere W. Morehead, When
a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure To
Eradicate Invidious Discriminationfrom Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 633-36
(1994).
37. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106; see also Cavise, supra note 36, at 501 ("Only the most
overtly discriminatory or impolitic lawyer can be caught in Batson's toothless bite and,
even then, the wound will be only superficial."); Jeffrey L. Fisher, No Clear Ideologies,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 2005, at 14, 14 ("All [Batson] seemed to require at times was that a
prosecutor or a court proffer a race-neutral reason, no matter how frivolous or
implausible, for each strike. Peremptory challenges, by their nature, are based on
stereotypes and intuitions, so courts often hesitated to delve very deeply into prosecutors'
motives."); Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not To Say Race) of
Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 59 (1993) ("If prosecutors exist who
...cannot create a 'racially neutral' reason for discriminating on the basis of race, bar
examinations are too easy. If judges exist who wish to believe proffered 'racially neutral'
reasons and cannot rationalize that desire, impeachment for incompetence ought to be
more frequent.").
38. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. For an empirical discussion of the
"marginal impact" of Batson and its progeny in one metropolitan area (Philadelphia), see
David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A
Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3,10 (2001).
39. Miller-El II, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005).
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the grain of a long tradition of respect for finality of judgments and
deference to trial courts as fact finders. It demonstrates that the
Court remains deeply concerned about the possible taint of any racial
discrimination in capital punishment proceedings and suggests that
appellate courts have not taken Batson review seriously enough in
capital cases.4" While the Miller-El II Court did not create any new
law or test, it did insist that courts fulfill their duty to conduct a
genuine and thorough inquiry in order to eliminate, to the extent
practicable, the specter of racial discrimination from the process of
sentencing a person to death.
The Supreme Court first heard Miller-El's appeal when the Fifth
Circuit denied him a certificate of appealability.4
The Supreme
Court reversed, ordering the Fifth Circuit to hear Miller-El's Batson
claim.42 On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied
Miller-El's Batson claim on the merits, and he appealed yet again to
the United States Supreme Court.4 3 Once again, the Supreme Court
reversed, this time with a six-three majority ruling directly on the
merits." Such a ruling is remarkable given the substantial burden of
proof Miller-El had to overcome: under the Antiterrorism and

40. See Fisher, supra note 37, at 14 (arguing that the Court's point in Miller-El II was
to tell "the lower courts to take Batson more seriously").
41. See Miller-El v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2001). The procedural history of
Miller-El's case is, in fact, labyrinthine. He first objected to his jury at his trial in 1986,
alleging systemic discrimination under the Swain standard. See Miller-El II, 125 S. Ct. at
2322. The trial court found no purposeful historical discrimination and therefore denied
him relief under Swain. Id. While his direct appeal was pending, the United States
Supreme Court decided Batson, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded
Miller-El's claim for a hearing on the Batson issue. Id. at 2322-23. After the trial court
found no Batson violation, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Id. at 2323.
The federal district court then denied Miller-El habeas corpus relief on the same claim,
leading him to appeal to the Fifth Circuit, which refused to hear his claim.
42. See Miller-El 1, 537 U.S. 322 (2002). A reversal on the certificate of appealability
issue in Miller-El I would have required little more than a "threshold inquiry into the
underlying merits of [the defendant's] claims." Id. at 327. And yet, in an eight to one
opinion, the Court launched into an intensive review of the evidence of the prosecution's
purposeful discrimination and ultimately came close to ruling on the merits. See id. at
331-47; see also Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Non-DiscriminationIdeal of Hernandez v.
Texas Confronts a "Culture" of Discrimination: The Amazing Story of Miller-El v. Texas,
25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 97, 129 (2005) ("What is quite striking about the Court's
opinion is the extent to which the Court seems to evaluate the merits of the claim itself
and appears to conclude that Miller-El may have presented a meritorious claim."). For a
synopsis of the Court's factual review in Miller-El H, see infra notes 50-75 and
accompanying text.
43. Miller-El 11, 125 S. Ct. at 2323.
44. Id. at 2340 ("The state court's conclusion that the prosecutors' strikes.., were not
racially determined is shown up as wrong to a clear and convincing degree; the state
court's conclusion was unreasonable as well as erroneous.").
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA"),5 to receive
federal habeas corpus relief, a capital defendant in Miller-El's
situation must prove that a state court's conclusion was "an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding. 4 6 This standard, coupled
with the "great deference" Batson suggested is owed to the trial
court's conclusions,47 creates a high hurdle for defendants with a
Batson claim. That the Supreme Court found Miller-El's evidence to

have overcome that hurdle is significant because it supports the
Court's intention to reinvigorate Batson review in capital cases. In
fact, the Court indicated this intent first in Miller-El I, stating that
"[e]ven in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply

abandonment or abdication of judicial review. Deference does not by
definition preclude relief."48 The Court
reiterated this stance in
49
Miller-El II and granted Miller-El relief.
In Miller-El II, the Court conducted a second review of Miller-

El's claim that was even more probing than in Miller-El I. In this
review, the Court repeatedly criticized the manner in which the court
of appeals treated the evidence."

The Supreme Court examined five

pieces of evidence of discrimination: 1) statistical evidence showing
that the prosecutors disproportionately excluded Blacks from the jury
venire; 1 2) disparate questioning by the prosecutor of Blacks and
Whites; 2 3) a side-by-side comparison of Black venire members who
were challenged with White panelists who were accepted;5 3 4) the use
by the prosecutor of a Texas practice of "jury shuffling" to move

45. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
46. Id. § 2254(d)(2).
47. See supra text accompanying note 32.
48. Miller-ElI,537 U.S. 322, 340 (2002).
49. Miller-El I1, 125 S. Ct. at 2325 ("The standard is demanding, but not insatiable; as
we said the last time this case was here, 'deference does not by definition preclude
relief.' " (citation omitted)). In this case, the Court remanded for "entry of judgment for
petitioner together with orders of appropriate relief," which will mean a new trial for
Miller-El. Id. at 2340.
50. See, e.g., id. at 2328 ("[T]he court's readiness to accept the State's substitute
reason ignores not only its pretextual timing but the other reasons rendering it
implausible."); id. at 2331 ("[T]his rationalization was erroneous as a matter of fact and as
a matter of law."); id. at 2339 ("We find this conclusion [of the court of appeals] as
unsupportable as the 'dismissive and strained interpretation' of his evidence that we
disapproved when we decided Miller-El was entitled to a certificate of appealability."); id.
at 2340 ("It blinks reality to deny that the State struck [the jurors] ... because they were
Black.").
51. Id. at 2325.
52. Id. at 2333.
53. Id. at 2325.
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Black members of the venire to the back of the order for voir dire
questioning; 54 and 5) evidence that the Dallas County prosecutors had
a specific policy of discrimination against Blacks in jury venires,
including the use of a manual entitled "Jury Selection in a Criminal
Case," which was distributed to Dallas County prosecutors in the
1970s and outlined why prosecutors should seek to exclude minorities
from juries.5 ' The latter two pieces of evidence involve local
procedures that may or may not be applicable to other states and
counties and were not central to the Court's analysis. The Court
wrote very little about the jury shuffling or the unofficial policy of the
56
prosecutor's office, spending less than a page of its opinion on each.
Conversely, the majority spent close to seven pages discussing the
disparate treatment of similarly situated jurors,57 and almost six pages
discussing the differential questioning of Black and non-Black
jurors.5 8 While it is true that the Court spent only a paragraph
discussing the statistics of the peremptory challenges used in the
case,5 9 these numbers were the first piece of evidence discussed by the
Court in both Miller-El 16° and Miller-El Jf,61 and the Court referred
to the statistical evidence three times more in the Miller-El II
opinion." Therefore, the remainder of this discussion will focus only
on the first three pieces of evidence.
The Court first noted that the "numbers describing the
prosecution's use of peremptories are remarkable."63 Of 108 venire
members, twenty of whom were Black, only one Black juror
ultimately helped decide Miller-El's fate. 6' The prosecution struck
ten of eleven Black prospective jurors (ninety-one percent) who
remained after challenges for cause.65 In contrast, the state struck
only thirteen percent of the eligible non-Black prospective jurors.66

54. Id. at 2332-33.
55. Id. at 2338-39 (citing Miller-El I, 537 U.S. 322, 334-35 (2003)). Another 1963
circular instructed Dallas County prosecutors: " 'Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos,
Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or how well
educated.' " Miller-El 1, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003) (citation omitted).
56. Miller-El II, 125 S. Ct. at 2332-33, 2339.
57. Id. at 2325-32.
58. Id. at 2333-38.
59. Id. at 2325.
60. Miller-El 1,537 U.S. at 331.
61. Miller-El II, 125 S. Ct. at 2325.
62. Id. at 2339-40.
63. Id. at 2325.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Miller-El 1, 537 U.S. at 331.
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Citing its decision in Miller-El I, the Court noted that
"'[h]appenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity.' ",67
The Court also discussed at some length the prosecution's use of
differential questioning of Black and non-Black jurors.'
The
prosecution used two different "scripts" to question venire members
about their views on the death penalty-one rather bland,69 the other
a graphic description of what would result if the jury imposed the
death penalty.70 Only six percent of prospective White jurors heard
the graphic script, while fifty-three percent of prospective Black
jurors heard it.7 Because the graphic script might be more likely to
prompt a reluctance to impose the death penalty, thereby giving the
prosecutor a race-neutral reason to challenge the juror, the Court
stated, "If the graphic script is given to a higher proportion of Blacks

than Whites, this is evidence that prosecutors more often wanted
Blacks off the jury, absent some neutral and extenuating
explanation. '72 The Court rejected the State's argument that the
graphic script was used to eliminate jurors who had expressed
uncertainty about the death penalty on their juror questionnaires,
finding that Blacks were more likely than non-Blacks to receive the
script regardless of feelings about the death penalty.7 3

Most importantly, however, the Court conducted an incisive
inquiry into side-by-side comparisons of Black jurors who were
challenged and non-Black jurors who were accepted, stating, "If a
prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a Black panelist applies just
as well to an otherwise-similar non-Black who is permitted to serve,
that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be
67. Miller-El II, 125 S. Ct. at 2325 (citing Miller El I, 537 U.S. at 342).
68. Id. at 2333-38.
69. Id. at 2334. The bland script simply noted that if the jury answered "yes" to a
series of questions, those answers would result in the death penalty for the defendant.
70. Id. This script involved the prosecutor pointing directly at Miller-El and
explaining that if the death penalty were imposed, the defendant would be "at some point
taken to the death house and placed on a gurney and injected with a lethal substance until
he is dead as a result of the proceedings that we have in this court." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2333-34.
73. Id. at 2335-36. The Court conducted a similar analysis of the prosecution's
questioning of jurors about the minimum sentence they might consider for murder-nonBlack jurors were disproportionately informed that the minimum was five years in Texas,
while Black jurors were more likely not to hear the minimum, again in order to create a
cause to strike jurors whose answers showed they would be tougher than the law required
(the Court noted the irony in this, stating that the "prosecutor would suppress his normal
preference for tough jurors and claim cause to strike"). Id. at 2337-38. Here again, the
Court stated, "[T]he implication of race in the prosecutors' choice of questioning cannot
be explained away." Id. at 2338.
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considered at Batson's third step." 4 The Court focused on two
challenged Black jurors, both of whom were challenged for their
statements during voir dire; however, these same statements were
echoed by accepted non-Black jurors. As explanation for the
challenges of these jurors, the State said that both had reservations
about the death penalty, but as the Court noted, several accepted
White jurors expressed similar sentiments.75
Lower courts should deduce three key principles from the
Court's decision in Miller-El II, the first two narrow and the third
broad. First, the Court made clear that it is not critical, when
comparing accepted and rejected jurors, that the two jurors be
identical in all respects for the comparison to be probative. Justice
Thomas's dissent challenged this notion, saying, " 'Similarly situated'
does not mean matching any one of several reasons the prosecution
gave for striking a potential juror-it means matching all of them."76
But the majority flatly rejected Justice Thomas's reasoning,
recognizing that requiring such a one-to-one match of all
characteristics would "leave Batson inoperable," because "potential
jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters. ' 77 Indeed, if
defendants were limited to comparing only those jurors for whom the
state's proffered reasons were identical in every way, a significant tool
for proving purposeful discrimination would be effectively eliminated.
This would leave the prosecutor free to use any reason at all for
challenging a Black juror (e.g., that the juror bit his fingernails during
voir dire and thus seemed nervous), knowing that this reason will not
be scrutinized:
if none of the non-Black jurors share the
characteristic, comparison would be impossible.
Second, the Court challenged attempts by the court of appeals
and by Justice Thomas to substitute their own race-neutral reasons
for the prosecution's strikes when the prosecutor's own given reasons
74. Id. at 2325.
75. Id. at 2327. The first challenged juror stated that he believed some people could
be rehabilitated and might take that into account in his decision to impose the death
penalty, but the accepted White jurors said the same. Id. The second juror said he
thought the death penalty might be too light of a punishment, yet other accepted White
jurors expressed similar opinions, as did the one Black juror that actually served. Id. at
2329-30. In both cases, the State attempted to offer other reasons to support these
challenges as well, but the Court dismissed these as pretextual because of the prosecutor's
failure to engage in meaningful voir dire with the jurors on those issues. Id. at 2328, 2330.
76. Id. at 2354 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas made the same argument in
Miller-El I, in which he was the lone dissenter from the Court's decision to grant Miller-El
a certificate of appealability. See Miller-El I, 537 U.S. 322, 362-63 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
77. Miller-ElH, 125 S. Ct. at 2329 n.6.
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were clearly pretextual. s Here, the Court made a critical point,
saying that a Batson objection requires more than "a mere exercise in
thinking up any rational basis. If the stated reason does not hold up,
its pretextual significance does not fade because a trial judge, or an
appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown
9
'7

up as false.
Third, and most importantly, the Court made another in a string
of implicit statements about the profound difference of death as a
punishment from any other punishment, and the ensuing need for
even greater accuracy and fairness in the proceedings that result in a
death sentence. 0
The United States Supreme Court has long
recognized that "the penalty of death is different in kind from any
other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice."'"
While the Supreme Court has held that the Batson doctrine
protects jurors' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection

78. Id. at 2330. In particular, the majority was concerned with the Fifth Circuit's and
Justice Thomas's statements that the prosecutor had stricken a particular juror because of
a general ambivalence toward the death penalty, see id. at 2331, or "inconsistent answers
about his ability to apply the death penalty," id. at 2346 (Thomas, J., dissenting), when in
fact, the juror expressed no general ambivalence but actually stated that the death penalty
might not be severe enough for some defendants. See id. at 2331 (majority opinion).
79. Id. at 2332. The Court also said, "The Court of Appeals's and the dissent's
substitution of a reason for eliminating [a juror] does nothing to satisfy the prosecutors'
burden of stating a racially neutral explanation for their own actions." Id. at 2331.
80. The Court's recent decisions in the areas of ineffective assistance of counsel and
prosecutorial misconduct also demonstrate the Court's concern that lower courts are not
conducting the critical intensive review of capital cases that Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence demands. For example, in Rompilla v. Beard, the Court held that defense
counsel has a duty to reasonably investigate all evidence that the prosecution might rely
on for aggravating circumstances, even though the defendant's family has indicated that
there is no mitigating evidence. 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2465-66 (2005). To grant relief in this
case, AEDPA required that the Court find that the state court's resolution of Rompilla's
claim was an "unreasonable application of [ ] clearly established Federal law." Id. at 2462
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)). The Court found objectively unreasonable the state
court's decision that Rompilla's counsel acted reasonably when it failed to investigate a
prior conviction that the prosecution intended to use for aggravation. Id. at 2465.
Similarly, the Court's decision in Banks v. Dretke was also an implicit statement that lower
courts must do a better job reviewing capital claims in order for the death penalty to
survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny. 540 U.S. 668 (2004). Like Miller-El II, the Court
announced no new law in Banks, but a strong majority (seven-two) held that the Fifth
Circuit had wrongly denied Banks's request for a certificate of appealability, when Banks
could show that the prosecution had withheld evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), that would have allowed Banks to impeach two of the State's key
witnesses. Banks, 540 U.S. at 675-76. These decisions demonstrate that the Court
remains very concerned that lower courts apply the necessary degree of rigor when
reviewing capital cases. Miller-El II is the third in this line of recent cases that seem to
rebuke lower courts for not taking capital cases seriously enough.
81. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
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(rather than defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial by a
cross-section of the community),82 the fundamental credibility of the
capital punishment process still depends in large part upon the
public's perception that the process is fair. As Justice Stevens has
noted, "It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the
community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and
appear to be, the consequence of scrupulously fair procedures. 8 3
Racial discrimination in jury selection, more than many other
possible procedural flaws, "casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial
process, and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt."'
While the Supreme Court has held that statistics indicating that race
is a significant factor in the imposition of the death penalty are not, by
themselves, enough to show a "constitutionally significant risk of
racial bias,"85 the Court is still keenly aware of the potential insidious
impact of racial factors in capital sentencing proceedings. For
example, on the same day the Court decided Batson, which applies to
all defendants, both capital and noncapital, the Court also decided
Turner v. Murray,6 in which it held that capital defendants accused of
interracial murders are entitled to question potential jury members
about racial bias, while noncapital defendants do not enjoy the same
constitutional right.8 7 The Court stated, "The risk of racial prejudice
infecting a capital sentencing proceeding is especially serious in light
of the complete finality of the death sentence.""8'
Having decided in 1976 that the death penalty is constitutional
only so long as its imposition is free from arbitrary or capricious
decisionmaking, s9 the Court is loath to permit race to be an operative
factor in capital proceedings, whether it be during jury selection or
jury deliberations. Miller-El II is another statement of the Court's
82. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990).
83. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 545-46 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (quotations omitted).
85. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987).
86. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
87. Id. at 33. The Court distinguished a prior case, Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589
(1976), where the Court held there was no constitutional right to question venire members
about racial bias, id. at 590, stating, "What sets this case apart from Ristaino, however, is
that in addition to petitioner's being accused of a crime against a White victim, the crime
charged was a capital offense." Turner, 476 U.S. at 33. The Court held, however, that the
constitutional violation only applied to the death sentence, not the guilty verdict. "The
inadequacy of voir dire in this case requires that petitioner's death sentence be vacated. It
is not necessary, however, that he be retried on the issue of guilt. Our judgment in this
case is that there was an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice infecting the capital
sentencingproceeding." Id. at 37.
88. Turner, 476 U.S. at 35.
89. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976).
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persistent vigilance in the capital punishment arena, and operates as
an admonition to lower courts to pay similar attention when
reviewing capital cases. This determination to achieve fairness in
capital sentencing explains the Court's ability to overcome its
preference for deference to state court determinations and for
preserving the finality of state court judgments.
It is difficult to predict how lower courts will treat Miller-El II.
On one hand, as discussed above, the majority opinion in Miller-El II
is a salient attempt to reanimate judicial review in the area of racial
discrimination in capital cases in particular and to return to the spirit
of Batson, when Batson's letter had proved somewhat inadequate in
getting reviewing courts' attention.90 The Court chided, and not
gently, the meager analysis conducted by the appellate courts below
it.91 The Court acknowledged that "[t]he rub [of Batson] has been the
practical difficulty of ferreting out discrimination in selections
discretionary by nature."92 In its review of Miller-El's Batson
evidence, the Court suggested three analytical tools to determine
whether purposeful discrimination has occurred in jury selection: 1)
review of statistical evidence;93 2) analysis of disparate questioning;94
and 3) comparison of challenged Black jurors with accepted nonBlack jurors.95 The Court painstakingly applied these tools to the
record to conclude that Miller-El was entitled to relief.
On the other hand, the decision has inherent weaknesses that
make its precedential value somewhat uncertain. When the Court
granted certiorari in Miller-El II, some wondered if there might be a
sea change in the works.96

Yet, while the Court stated that

"deference does not preclude relief," it also noted that it was the
collective weight of Miller-El's evidence (the raw statistics, the
disparate questioning, the side-by-side comparisons, the use of the
jury shuffle, and the evidence of a historical policy of discrimination)
that was "too powerful to conclude anything but discrimination."'97
Unfortunately, the average defendant trying to prove that purposeful
90. For a discussion of Batson's failure to provide the necessary framework to
eliminate racial discrimination in jury selection, see generally Cavise, supra note 36.
91. See supra note 50.
92. Miller-El II, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2324 (2005).
93. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
96. See Thompson, supra note 42, at 100 ("If the Court finds that Miller-El has
substantiated his claim of discrimination, it will be interesting to see how broadly the
Court's proscription of discrimination will extend .... Will the Court ease the burden
placed on petitioners to prove discrimination?").
97. Miller-El 11, 125 S. Ct. at 2339.
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discrimination is at work in the selection of his jury will seldom have
all five of these pieces of evidence at his disposal. Thus when a
defendant attempts to use Miller-El II to coax an appellate court to
examine the evidence more closely, the court can still shirk its
responsibility by noting that the defendant's evidence, viewed
cumulatively, does not have the same weight that Miller-El's did, and
therefore, does not merit relief.98 Such an approach leaves the
opinion open to an interpretation that it should operate as a factspecific test for Batson claims, instead of a broader mandate to
intensify capital review of racial discrimination in jury selection.
Given the court's recent pronouncements in other areas of capital
punishment,99 lower courts should view it as the latter. Otherwise, the
unfortunate result will be that, once again, only the most blatant and
overt cases of discrimination will fall within Batson's radar.
III. WILL NORTH CAROLINA RESPOND?

The need for intensive scrutiny of Batson claims in capital
appeals cannot be understated in a state like North Carolina, which
ranks seventh in the nation both in the number of inmates on the
state's death row and the number of inmates executed since
executions resumed in the United States in 1976.1° The issue of race
remains prominent in the state's dialogue about the death penalty.
Sixty-three percent of North Carolina's death row inmates are racial
minorities, 0' compared to forty-five percent of death row inmates
nationwide."° Preliminary findings in a recent study of the state's
capital sentencing system shows that even controlling for other
variables, such as prior convictions or murders committed in the
98. In fact, several reviewing courts have already used this tactic to reject a Batson
claim. See Majid v. Portuondo, 428 F.3d 112, 131 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting petitioner's
Batson claim and distinguishing that case from Miller-El II, stating that petitioner lacked
similar evidence of past discriminatory practices in the prosecutor's office like the use of
jury shuffling or official policies); Murphy v. Dretke, 416 F.3d 427, 439 (5th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting Batson claim where defendant was tried and convicted by an all-White jury after
the State struck five of six prospective Black jurors, noting that there was no evidence of
jury shuffling or a decades-old prosecution manual suggesting historical discrimination
against Black venire members); McPherson v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2005)
(rejecting defendant's claim and distinguishing the "overwhelming evidence" in Miller-El
II from the face in the case at bar).
99. See supra note 80.
100. DEBORAH FINS, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.,

DEATH Row USA FALL 2005, at 6, 25-27 (2005), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/
content/pdf/pubs/drusa/drusajfall_2005.pdf.
101. North Carolina Department of Corrections, Offenders on Death Row, http://www.
doc.state.nc.us/dop/deathpenalty/deathrow.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2006).
102. FINS, supra note 100, at 1.
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course of rapes or robberies, a defendant is three and a half times
more likely to receive the death penalty if the murder victim is
White.

°3

The highest rate of death penalties occurs when the

defendant is non-White and the victim is White (6.4%) and the lowest
when the defendant is White and the victim non-White (1.7%).. °

Furthermore, currently thirty-eight of thirty-nine (97%) North
Carolina district attorneys (who make the decision to seek the death
penalty) °5 are White.0 6 Thus, race is still very much a salient factor
in North Carolina's capital punishment system.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, like the
Texas state courts and the Fifth Circuit in Miller-El's case, has
traditionally been completely deferential to trial court determinations
of the facts in Batson claims 0

7

In almost every single capital case

where the Supreme Court of North Carolina has considered a Batson
claim, it has remarked that because Batson determinations often turn
on the credibility of the prosecutor's stated reasons for the
objectionable challenges, the trial court is owed great deference. 8
103.

ISAAC UNAH & JOHN CHARLES BOGER, RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN

NORTH CAROLINA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: 1993-1997, at 4 (2001), available at http://

www.common-sense.org/pdfs/NCDeathPenaltyReport200l.pdf.
104. Id. at 3.
105. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2004 (2005) ("The State, in its discretion, may elect to
try a defendant capitally or noncapitally for first degree murder, even if evidence of an
aggravating circumstance exists.").
106. Email correspondence with Peg Doter, Director, N.C. Conference of Dist.
Attorneys, in Raleigh, N.C. (Feb. 10, 2006). This figure is comparable to that in most
states, where the percentages of White district attorneys in 1998 ranged from 93%-100%,
with a national average of 97.5%. See RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN BLACK AND WHITE:

WHO LIVES,

WHO DIES, WHO DECIDES, fig.9 (1998), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (click on
"Reports" and scroll to the title).
107. See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the Supreme
Court of North Carolina has never overruled a trial court's substantive determination on a
Batson issue); see also Cavise, supra note 36, at 527-35 (discussing numerous cases from
several different state and federal courts where a wide variety of allegedly race-neutral
reasons were upheld on appeal).
108. See, e.g., State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 469-70, 546 S.E.2d 575, 586-87 (2001) ("A
trial court's rulings regarding race-neutrality and purposeful discrimination are largely
based on evaluations of credibility and should be given great deference."); see also State v.
Lawrence, 352 N.C. 1, 14, 530 S.E.2d 807, 816 (2000) (same); State v. White, 349 N.C. 535,
549, 508 S.E.2d 253, 262 (1998) (same); State v. Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417, 433, 502 S.E.2d 563,
575 (1998) (same). Note that the United States Supreme Court did suggest in Batson,
albeit in dicta and in a footnote, that because of the credibility determinations involved,
trial courts should be given deference on these determinations. Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986). The deference offered by the Supreme Court of North Carolina to
trial court rulings on these matters is not surprising given North Carolina's long tradition
of allowing the litigating attorneys great leeway in the jury selection process. See
Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1539 n.54. North Carolina was also one of the first states to
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However, in light of the United States Supreme Court's implicit
demand in Miller-El II that appellate courts conduct a more vigorous
review of Batson claims in capital cases, much of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina's jurisprudence in this area will have to change
significantly. The fact that Miller-El won federal habeas corpus relief,
despite the enormous hurdles facing defendants in that process, 1°9
suggests that the Supreme Court of North Carolina's consistent and
automatic deference to trial court determinations on a simple direct
appeal has been off target. The Miller-El II opinions outlined two
approaches to Batson review: that of the majority, which involved a
searching, earnest inquiry into the facts and circumstances giving rise
to an inference of discrimination, and that of Justice Thomas, which
took a hands-off, very deferential approach to review of trial court
decisions."1 This Part will examine how the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has consistently chosen the latter approach, particularly as
regards the treatment of the three types of evidence considered in
Miller-El II. This Part will consider each kind of evidence-statistics,
disparate questioning, and side-by-side juror comparisons-and
discuss how the Supreme Court of North Carolina has also condoned
the use of the trial court's own substituted race-neutral reasons for
the state's peremptory challenges, in direct contradiction to the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Miller-El I1.111
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has only once held that
statistical evidence of racial discrimination in capital cases is enough
to make a prima facie case under the Batson test."1 While Miller-El
II does not suggest that statistics alone are enough for a final
determination of racial discrimination, it does suggest that statistics
are probative of an inference of discrimination, which is all the
defendant need show at the prima facie stage of the Batson process. 13
In Miller-El I, the Court stated that "the statistical evidence alone
allow peremptory challenges in jury selection. Id. at 1538. Furthermore, trial judges are
not even required to make a record of jury selection in noncapital cases except on motion
of one of the parties. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1241(a)(1). Nor is the North Carolina
Supreme Court the only state court to construe Batson so narrowly. See, e.g., John H.
Blume, Racial Discrimination in the State's Use of Peremptory Challenges: The
Application of the United States Supreme Court's Decision in Batson v. Kentucky in South
Carolina,40 S.C. L. REV. 299, 300 (1989) (arguing that the South Carolina Supreme Court
has taken an "unduly restrictive view" of the Batson decision).
109. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing the high hurdles
defendants must overcome in federal habeas proceedings).
110. See supranotes 50-79 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
112. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
113. See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
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raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a racebased reason when striking prospective jurors.11 4 Although the
Court was addressing the issue of debatability (the standard for the
issuance of a certificate of appealability) rather than the Batson
standard per se, this statement still acknowledges that statistical
evidence alone can be some indication of possible discrimination:
In both Miller-El I and Miller-El II, the statistical evidence was

the first factor discussed." 5 In Miller-El II, the Court described the
statistical evidence as "remarkable.""' 6

Furthermore, in a case

decided the same day as Miller-El II, the Court held that simple
numbers alone, without any other facts or circumstances, were
enough to raise an 7inference of discrimination to satisfy the first step
of the Batson test."

In the only North Carolina capital case where the acceptance
rate of Black jurors was, in and of itself, enough to raise a prima facie
case of discrimination, the prosecutor accepted only 28.6% of the

eligible Black jurors. 18 In this case, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina noted that it "risk[ed] splitting hairs unduly if [it]
attempt[ed] to distinguish between the 37.5% acceptance rate of
prospective minority jurors" found insufficient in another case" 9 but
also noted that the prima facie case was never intended to be a major
hurdle for defendants-it is only supposed to be enough to shift the
burden to the State to provide race-neutral reasons for its
challenges. 20

114. Miller-ElI, 537 U.S. 322, 342 (2003).
115. See id.; Miller-EI, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005).
116. Miller-El I, 125 S. Ct. at 2325.
117. See Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2413 (2005). In Johnson, the trial court
found that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case, even though the
prosecution challenged all three of the prospective Black jurors, resulting in an all-White
jury. Id. at 2414. The trial court stated that the question was close but found no inference
of discrimination, and the California Supreme Court deferred to that judgment. Id. at
2415. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the statistical evidence, which was all Johnson
offered to bolster his Batson objection, was enough to make the trial judge remark "that
'weare very close,' " and that on review, the California Supreme Court found it suspicious
that the only available Black jurors were challenged. Id. at 2419. The Court held that
"[t]hose inferences ...were sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Batson," and
that the defendant need not prove that race was more likely than not the reason for the
challenges. Id.
118. See State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 344, 572 S.E.2d 108, 127-28 (2002). Note that
this is one of three cases in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina has remanded on
procedural grounds for a new Batson hearing. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
119. See State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365, 398, 459 S.E.2d 638, 657 (1995) (holding that a
37.5% acceptance rate was not enough for prima facie case).
120. See Barden, 356 N.C. at 344, 572 S.E.2d at 127-28.
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Nevertheless, no other capital defendant has successfully used

statistical evidence alone to make his prima facie case. Although the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized that discrimination
against even one juror would violate Batson,21 it has also held that

the prosecution can sometimes accept enough jurors of a certain race
to refute an inference of discrimination.1 21 Indeed, in many cases, the
court has found that a certain acceptance rate of Black jurors either
negates a defendant's attempt to raise a prima facie case 123 or is a
probative rebuttal to a prima facie case. 124 Even when the
prosecutor's challenges remove every eligible Black juror from the
venire, this alone has not been enough to establish a prima facie
case. 25 Thus, the prima facie showing has been very much a high
hurdle for defendants to overcome.

In Miller-El H, the United States Supreme Court took note of
the fact that Miller-El's prosecutors accepted only nine percent of
eligible Black jurors,' 26 while it had previously noted in Miller-El I
that the State accepted fully eighty-seven percent of the eligible nonBlack jurors. 27 While the Court stated that this discrepancy was

121. See State v. Rouse, 339 N.C. 59, 80, 451 S.E.2d 543, 554 n.3 (1994) ("We
emphasize that exercising some peremptory challenges in a manner which does not
discriminate on the basis of race does not correct, or erase, a constitutional violation as to
an individual juror.").
122. See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 141, 505 S.E.2d 277, 290-91 (1998)
("[Wlhile the excusal of even a single juror for a racially discriminatory reason is
impermissible, the trial court may consider the acceptance rate of minority jurors by the
State as evidence bearing on alleged discriminatory intent." (citations omitted)).
123. See, e.g., Nicholson, 355 N.C. at 24, 558 S.E.2d at 126-27 (holding that a 50%
acceptance rate is not low enough to show a prima facie case); State v. Braxton, 352 N.C.
158, 182, 531 S.E.2d 428, 442 (2000) (holding that a 47% acceptance rate is not low
enough); State v. Fletcher, 348 N.C. 292, 320, 500 S.E.2d 668, 684 (1998) (40%); State v.
Gregory, 340 N.C. 365, 398, 459 S.E.2d 638, 657 (1995) (37.5%); Allen, 323 N.C. at 219,
372 S.E.2d at 862 (41%).
124. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420, 445, 562 S.E.2d 859, 875 (2002) (holding
that the fact that the final jury consisted of ten Blacks and two Whites refutes an inference
of discriminatory intent); State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 431, 407 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1991)
(holding that although the prosecutor accepted only 13.5% of eligible Black jurors, and
78.4% of Whites the fact that the very first panelist accepted by the prosecutor was Black
tends to refute an inference of discrimination).
125. See State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 342, 611 S.E.2d 794, 807 (2005) (holding that
the State's challenge of the only three Black venire members not excused for cause was
not, by itself, enough to make a prima facie case); Williams, 343 N.C. at 359-60, 471 S.E.2d
at 387 (same, but two Black venire members challenged); State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712,
719, 392 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1990) (holding that without evidence of some pattern of
discrimination by the district attorney's office, there is no reason to suspect racial motive,
even when the State challenged the only Black venire members).
126. Miller-El H, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005).
127. See Miller-El 1, 537 U.S. 322, 331 (2003).
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likely evidence of discrimination, 28 it gave no guidance as to if or
when lower courts should draw a line marking an acceptance rate
under which there might be a per se inference of impermissible
discrimination to make out a prima facie case. When the Supreme
Court of North Carolina holds that a low acceptance rate relative to
other races is not enough even to raise a mere inference of
discrimination that the State must rebut with race-neutral reasons, it
allows for the possibility that any one of the challenged venire
members might have been stricken because of race, without even
asking the State to justify itself. It encourages the State to accept one
or two Black jurors early on so that it might avoid Batson scrutiny
when it wants to purposefully exclude Black jurors later. The court
states, rightly, that numbers alone are not dispositive proof of
discrimination'29 but then simply ignores the numbers altogether
when determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie case.
Despite statistical evidence that should give rise to an inference
of discrimination, the trial court rulings on the prima facie case in
many of these cases are based upon the court's own consideration of
the challenged venire members' responses on voir dire. 3 ' For
example, in State v. Williams, the trial court stated, " '[T]he Court
holds that there hasn't been a prima facia [sic] showing that [the
prosecutor] purposefully discriminated at all on the basis of the
Court's hearing of the [jurors'] answers and especially the demeanor
of the last one.' ",131 Considering these responses during the prima
facie step of Batson also contravenes Miller-ElM, because in so doing,
the trial court comes up with its own race-neutral reasons to rebut the
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Williams, 343 N.C. at 360, 471 S.E.2d at 387.
130. See, e.g., State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 716, 616 S.E.2d 515, 522 (2005) ("The
trial court observed Bryant's answers concerning her son, and such responses from
prospective jurors are pertinent to a determination of whether defendant has met his
burden [of making a prima facie case of discrimination]."); Chapman, 359 N.C. at 342-43,
611 S.E.2d at 808 ("[R]esponses of prospective jurors during voir dire are relevant
circumstances which may be considered to determine whether a defendant has established
a prima facie showing under Batson."); State v. Nicholson, 355 N.C. 1, 23, 558 S.E.2d 109,
126 (2002) ("The responses of these jurors, even if insufficient to support a challenge for
cause, are relevant to a determination of whether defendant has made a prima facie
showing." (citations omitted)); Williams, 343 N.C. at 471 S.E.2d at 387 ("The trial court
based its finding [of no prima facie case] on the answers and demeanor of the
peremptorily excused jurors .... [Therefore] we must give the court's judgment
deference."); State v. Richardson, 342 N.C. 772, 783, 467 S.E.2d 685, 691 (1996) (citing
facts from the record about prospective juror's statements during voir dire that refute a
prima facie case, when neither trial court nor prosecutor mentioned them); State v.
Gregory, 340 N.C. 365,398, 459 S.E.2d 638, 657 (1995) (same).
131. Williams, 343 N.C. at 359, 471 S.E.2d at 387.
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defendant's objection instead of forcing the State to justify its
challenges and then ruling on whether those reasons appear to be
mere pretext.132
While the Miller-El II opinion was primarily concerned with
courts substituting their own reasons at Batson's third step
(determining whether the state's proffered race-neutral reasons are
plausible and then substituting other race-neutral reasons supported
by the record if they are not), a trial court commits a similar error
when it considers jurors' voir dire responses when determining
whether a defendant has made a prima facie case. When the
Supreme Court of North Carolina defers to these findings on review,
it allows discriminatory prosecutors to escape scrutiny. Permitting
the trial court to consider its own view of the jurors in deciding
whether a defendant made a prima facie case, even in the face of
stark statistical evidence of discrimination, takes the burden off the
prosecution to articulate a specific, race-neutral reason for its
challenges.13 3 This kind of deferential review will not satisfy the
obligation set forth by Miller-El II to conduct more than a cursory
analysis of the trial court's determination of the facts.
The other two analytical tools used by the United States
Supreme Court in Miller-El II were an examination of disparate
questioning of Black and non-Black venire members 34 and a side-byside comparison of challenged Black jurors with accepted non-Black
The issue of disparate questioning has been raised by the
jurors.'
defendant in only a handful of North Carolina capital cases, and in
each, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has rejected the
132. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79; see also Schwartz, supra note 6, at 155256. Schwartz notes that the practice of trial judges considering voir dire responses as
relevant circumstances at the first step of the Batson inquiry is a common one in North
Carolina courts. Id. at 1552. Schwartz also discusses how this practice inherently
contradicts Batson: "The language of Batson specifically commands that prosecutors
provide legitimate reasons for their peremptory challenges once defendants establish a
prima facie case. If the lower courts consider prosecutors' potential reasons before the
prosecutors state those reasons themselves, this command becomes meaningless." Id. at
1554.
133. See also Fisher, supra note 37, at 14 ("Further, the [Miller-El Ii] court clarified
that courts may not search for and proffer their own race-neutral justifications to resolve
Batson challenges. Prosecutors are responsible for the reasons they give, and those
reasons alone must justify their actions in terms of the equal protection clause.");
Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1554-55 ("[Tiaking prosecutors' anticipated reasons into
account at the prima facie stage prevents the proper functioning of the Batson prima facie
case," which is to shift the evidentiary burden to the prosecution to "explain their
allegedly discriminatory actions upon a mere threshold showing by the defendant.").
134. See Miller-El II, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2333-38 (2005).
135. Id. at 2325-32.
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arguments with the same reasoning it uses to reject arguments
regarding side-by-side comparisons of jurors.'3 6 Thus, this Part will
discuss the two together.
The United States Supreme Court made clear in Miller-El II that
in order for a side-by-side comparison of two prospective jurors to be
probative in determining whether a state's proffered reasons are mere
pretext for racial discrimination, the prosecutor's reasons for
challenging the two jurors need not be identical in every way.'3 7 The
Court's discussion recognizes that such a requirement of total identity
would defy common sense, for it would effectively eliminate
comparison of jurors as a tool for exposing pretext, since it would be a
rare case indeed where two prospective jurors were challenged for the
exact same reasons.
Again, a review of the Supreme Court of North Carolina's past
analyses of such claims demonstrates that it has never before used
and in fact has rejected the Miller-El H majority's approach. In every
case where a capital defendant has attempted to use side-by-side
comparison of challenged and accepted jurors to prove that the state's
race-neutral reasons were pretextual, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has rejected these arguments using the same logic employed
by Justice Thomas in Miller-El I1.138 The first post-Batson capital
defendant to raise the issue of side-by-side comparisons in North
Carolina was William Porter in 1990.139 Porter was Native American,
and the state challenged ten out of thirteen Native American
prospective jurors at his trial." ° Porter argued both that similarly
situated White jurors had been accepted by the state and that the
prosecutor had questioned Native American venire members
differently from Whites. 141 In rejecting this claim, the court laid out
its precedent for how it would analyze such claims:

136. See State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 341, 611 S.E.2d 794, 807 (2005); State v.
Fletcher, 348 N.C. 292, 317, 500 S.E.2d 668, 682-83 (1998); State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184,
212, 481 S.E.2d 44, 59 (1997); State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 127, 400 S.E.2d 712, 727-28
(1991); State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 501, 391 S.E.2d 144, 152 (1990).
137. Miller-El H, 125 S. Ct. at 2329 n.6.
138. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
139. See Porter,326 N.C. at 501, 391 S.E.2d at 152.
140. Id. at 499, 391 S.E.2d at 151.
141. Id. at 501, 391 S.E.2d at 152. Specifically, Porter argued on appeal that the
prosecutor had challenged some of the Native American jurors because they knew the
defense counsel, had been represented by the defense counsel, or had unsteady
employment backgrounds, while White jurors with these same characteristics had been
passed by the State. Id.
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[T]he alleged disparate treatment of prospective jurors would
not be dispositive necessarily. Choosing jurors, more art than
science, involves a complex weighing of factors. Rarely will a
single factor control the decision-making process. Defendant's
approach in this appeal involves finding a single factor among
the several articulated by the prosecutor as to each challenged

prospective juror and matching it to a passed juror who
exhibited that same factor. This approach fails to address the
factors as a totality which when considered together provide an
image of a juror considered in the case undesirable by the
State.142
Here, the court almost prophesies Justice Thomas's dissents in
both Miller-El cases, where he argued that "similarly situated" means
matching not just one but all of the given reasons for a strike.'43
Having made its position clear, the court has not yet changed it
in any capital appeal. No capital defendant has succeeded in proving
that the State's proffered race-neutral reasons were pretextual by
comparing rejected non-White jurors with accepted White jurors.
While at least nineteen capital defendants have made the argument
and been denied relief,1" a few of the most extreme cases are
noteworthy. In State v. Lyons,145 for example, the State challenged
one Black juror because she was a nurse, saying it "did not want those
folks with an absolute nurturing type of personality. ' 146 Yet the State
accepted three other White jurors who were nurses. 47 On review, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina gave its standard pronouncement
142. Id.
143. See Miller-El II, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2354 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Miller-El I,
537 U.S. 322, 362-63 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
144. See State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 341-43, 611 S.E.2d 794, 807-08 (2005); State
v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 15-16, 603 S.E.2d 93, 104 (2004); State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420, 445-46,
562 S.E.2d 859, 875-76 (2002); State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 471, 546 S.E.2d 575, 588 (2001);
State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 430, 533 S.E.2d 168, 213 (2000); State v. Lawrence, 352
N.C. 1, 15, 530 S.E.2d 807, 816 (2000); State v. Thomas, 350 N.C. 315, 332-35, 514 S.E.2d
486, 497-99 (1999); State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 140, 505 S.E.2d 277, 289-90 (1998);
State v. Fletcher, 348 N.C. 292, 317, 500 S.E.2d 668, 682-83 (1998); State v. Barnes, 345
N.C. 184, 211-12, 481 S.E.2d 44, 59 (1997); State v. Lyons, 343 N.C. 1, 13-14, 468 S.E.2d
204, 209 (1996); State v. Richardson, 342 N.C. 772, 783, 467 S.E.2d 685, 691 (1996); State v.
Kandies, 342 N.C. 419, 435-36, 467 S.E.2d 67, 75-76 (1996); State v. Williams, 339 N.C. 1,
17-19, 452 S.E.2d 245, 255-56 (1994); State v. Rouse, 339 N.C. 59, 80, 451 S.E.2d 543, 554
(1994); State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 19, 409 S.E.2d 288, 298 (1991); State v. Thomas, 329
N.C. 423, 432, 407 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1991); State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 123-24, 400 S.E.2d
712, 725-26 (1991); Porter,326 N.C. at 501, 391 S.E.2d at 152.
145. 343 N.C. 1, 468 S.E.2d 204 (1996).
146. Id. at 12, 468 S.E.2d at 208.
147. Id. at 13, 468 S.E.2d at 209.
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about refusing to compare a single factor between two jurors. 148
However, when the State makes a categorical statement that it does
not want a Black juror because she is a nurse and nurses have a
"nurturing personality" that the State does not want on its jury, it
cannot then turn around and accept three White nurses without
raising suspicion. Yet neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court
of North Carolina found a Batson violation.
1 49 the defendant
In State v. Fletcher,
argued both that the
prosecution had questioned a particular Black juror, Greene, more
intensively than White jurors about his views on the fairness of the
criminal justice system and also that the prosecution struck Greene
for expressing reservation about it but accepted White jurors who
expressed similar views. 50 Again, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina rejected this approach because it did not consider all the
factors a prosecutor might weigh when striking a juror."' However,
the reservation was the primary reason the State gave for excusing
Greene." 2 But what renders the court's decision to ignore this sideby-side comparison most suspect is that the trial court had already
found that a Batson violation had occurred with another juror,
McKinney, stricken at the same time as Greene. When the court
asked the prosecutor for his reasons for striking McKinney, the
prosecutor could not answer right away, and when he finally
answered, he stated that McKinney was a member of the NAACP, an
organization the prosecutor "strongly associate[d] with being antistate and anti-death penalty."' 53 He struck McKinney even though
McKinney had stated during voir dire that he did not know the
NAACP's position on the death penalty and did not himself oppose

148. See id. at 13-14, 468 S.E.2d at 209.
149. 348 N.C. 292, 500 S.E.2d 668 (1998).
150. Id. at 317, 500 S.E.2d at 682-83.
151. Id. at 317-18, 500 S.E.2d at 683.
152. Id. at 313-14, 500 S.E.2d at 680-81. While the opinion states that the prosecutor
also offered the juror's prior record as a reason for the strike, the opinion is unclear as to
whether the prosecutor actually raised the conviction as a reason for the challenge. The
quoted portion of voir dire with Greene simply refers to the prosecution's questioning of
Greene regarding a prior DWI case. Id. at 315-15, 500 S.E.2d at 681-82. The opinion
then refers to the trial court's findings of fact that Greene had "previously been convicted
of a misdemeanor and expressed a significant degree of dissatisfaction with the court
system," and the trial court's conclusion that "the reasons given to excuse Mr. Greene, his
expressed lack of confidence in the court system and his prior record, were racially neutral
.... Thus,
. it is unclear whether the prosecutor actually offered the prior record as a
reason for striking Greene, or the court substituted the prior conviction as its own reason
for upholding the challenge.
153. Id. at 315, 500 S.E.2d at 682.
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the death penalty.154 The judge determined that this proffered reason
was not race-neutral and offered as a remedy to throw out the entire
jury panel-at which point the State withdrew its challenge.155 Here,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina deferred again to the trial
court's determination and refused to even consider the side-by-side
comparison involving prospective juror Greene despite the probative
weight of the other incident of discrimination.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the court rejected a sideby-side comparison argument in State v. Kandies.56 This case takes
on particular importance for two reasons. First, Kandies's federal
habeas corpus appeal from the Fourth Circuit 157 was pending before
the United States Supreme Court when that Court decided Miller-El
II. After its decision in Miller-El 11, the Court granted Kandies's
petition for certiorari, vacated the denial of relief by the Court of
Appeals, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of MillerEl II.158 This suggests that the Court intended the Fourth Circuit to
use Miller-El II as a guideline for reviewing Kandies's Batson claim.
Secondly, the facts of Kandies's case are very similar to those in
Miller-El's. The prosecutor in Kandies's case challenged nine out of
twelve eligible Black jurors, or seventy-five percent. 15 9 Furthermore,
there was significant evidence that the prosecutor treated Black
venire members differently from similarly situated White venire
members. 6°
The prosecutor justified his challenges of five of the Black jurors
16
based on their responses to his questions about capital punishment. '
The prosecutor described one of these jurors as "hesitant '162 on the
death penalty, even though the juror stated she did not oppose capital
punishment and could follow the law. 163 But the prosecutor accepted
several White jurors who expressed similar views on the death
154. Id. at 315-16, 500 S.E.2d at 682.
155. Id. at 316, 500 S.E.2d at 682
156. State v. Kandies, 342 N.C. 419, 435-36, 467 S.E.2d 67, 75-76 (1996).
157. See Kandies v. Polk, 385 F.3d 457, 502 (4th Cir. 2004).
158. Kandies v. Polk, 125 S. Ct. 2974, 2974 (2005).
159. Kandies, 342 N.C. at 435, 467 S.E.2d at 75. Kandies raised his Batson objections
successively at four different points when Black jurors were challenged individually or in
groups. See id. at 435-37, 467 S.E.2d at 75-76. The trial court considered each objection
in turn, as did the Supreme Court of North Carolina, see id., so neither court ever
considered the cumulative effect of the statistical evidence.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 435-36, 467 S.E.2d at 75-76.
162. Transcript of Jury Selection Proceedings at 124, Kandies, 342 N.C. 419 (No.
197A94) (prospective juror Randleman).
163. Id. at 85-86.
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penalty, including one who arguably was more hesitant about the
death penalty than the challenged juror. 164
The prosecutor also challenged one Black juror ostensibly
because she worked with three- and four-year old children. 165 But the
prosecutor accepted other White venire members who were
associated with young children, including two elementary school

teachers.166 One of the accepted jurors even admitted that she might
have difficulty being impartial because she had "really young ones at
school."' 67

Kandies alleged further disparate treatment of Black and nonBlack venire members based on those jurors' concerns about missing
work while sitting on the jury. While the State challenged a Black

juror for this reason, the state accepted two White jurors who
expressed similar concerns, one of whom ,even stated that missing
work would be a "very big problem" for him. 68
Finally, there was evidence in Kandies's case of historical
discrimination against Black jurors by this prosecutor: the defense
counsel, in lodging his first Batson objection, noted that "in [his] ten
years of practice," he had never seen this prosecutor "[leave] a single
minority member on the jury that he has picked. 1 69 Despite this
history, the statistical evidence, and all of the evidence of disparate
treatment of similarly situated Black and White jurors, the Supreme

164. Id. at 666 (prospective juror Spence). The accepted White juror in question, when
asked whether she had strong feelings about capital punishment, answered, "That's a hard
question. I have been thinking about that since we came in here Tuesday, a lot. Only in
certain cases do I think it would be necessary." Id.
165. Id. at 124 (prospective juror Jinwright). This reason is particularly suspect. The
victim in this case was a four-year-old girl, Kandies, 342 N.C. at 430, 467 S.E.2d at 72, so it
would seem that jurors with children that age would be more likely to favor the State, not
the defendant.
166. See Transcript, supra note 162, at 675-76 (prospective juror Spence had taught
second grade, kindergarten, and preschool); id. at 1004-05 (prospective juror Arlington
was an elementary school teacher).
167. Id. at 1006 (prospective juror Arlington).
168. Prospective White juror Mayberry was self-employed and said, "Figuring out how
to pay the bills will be a hardship" and that missing work would be "a very big problem."
Id. at 132. The State later passed him. See id. at 158 (noting that the State challenged only
prospective jurors McClure and Rawlinson, both Black). Prospective White juror Bryant
also suggested that being away from work would be difficult for him. See id. at 448-49.
The State later passed him as well. See id. at 466 (prosecutor passes all the jurors he has
just examined). But the State challenged prospective Black juror Hines, id. at 597-98, who
also expressed concern about being away from work, id. at 595-96. Upon a Batson
objection, the first reason the prosecutor gave for challenging Hines was Hines's concern
about his employment. Id. at 599.
169. Id. at 123.
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Court of North Carolina clung to its old mantra, citing its original
holding in Porter:70
Defendant's approach "involves finding a single factor among
the several articulated by the prosecutor ... and matching it to

a passed juror who exhibited that same factor." We rejec[t] this
approach ... again because it "fails to address the factors as a
'
totality which [render] a juror.., undesirable by the State."171

Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court of North Carolina is
well-entrenched in its doctrine regarding the assessment of a
prosecutor's disparate treatment of similarly situated White and nonWhite jurors. Given Miller-El II, however, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina seems to have decided Kandies's Batson claim
wrongly. Considering the statistical evidence, the evidence of pretext
inherent in the disparate treatment of similarly situated jurors, and
the alleged historical discrimination by this prosecutor's office, "[iut
blinks reality to deny that the State struck [the jurors] ... because
they were Black."' 7 2 Thomas Miller-El had evidence of very similar

discrimination to that in Kandies's case and won federal habeas
corpus relief from the United States Supreme Court. That Jeff
Kandies could not even win relief on direct appeal to the Supreme
Court of North Carolina highlights the lethargic nature of that court's
Batson review in capital cases.
After Miller-El II, Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence will tolerate such lethargy no longer.
CONCLUSION

The critical question that remains is whether lower courts will
treat Miller-El II as a directive to view Batson claims with much more
scrutiny or as merely a narrow factual determination in one particular
case against which to measure other Batson claims.'73 To comport
with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina must view the decision as the former: a mandate to

170. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
171. State v. Kandies, 342 N.C. 419, 435-36, 467 S.E.2d 67, 75-76 (1996) (citing State v.
Porter,326 N.C. 489, 501, 391 S.E.2d 144, 152 (1990)).
172. Miller-El II, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2340 (2005).
173. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit, whose opinion was reversed in Miller-El II, has already
characterized the decision as the latter: "The Court did not announce any new elements or
criteria for determining a Batson claim, but rather simply made a final factual and
evidentiary determination of that particular petitioner's Batson claim .
Murphy v.
Dretke, 416 F.3d 427,439 (5th Cir. 2005).
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increase its scrutiny of Batson claims in capital appeals. 174

No

lingering shadow of the nation's long history of racial discrimination
has any place in our criminal justice system, let alone in jurisprudence
that governs life-or-death determinations.11 5 The role of the courts in
ensuring both the actual and perceived fairness of the capital

punishment process cannot be understated, and the Supreme Court of
North Carolina must bring to an end its practice of allowing even the

worst cases of discrimination in capital jury selection to escape
unremedied.
AMANDA

S. HITCHCOCK

174. Unfortunately, there is no sign of any change in sight. The court has heard one
capital case with a Batson claim since Miller-El II was decided. See State v. Augustine, 359
N.C. 709, 616 S.E.2d 515 (2005). Not once did the court mention Miller-El II, and with
little discussion, the court upheld the finding of the trial court that the defendant had not
established a prima facie case, even though the defendant raised the objection when the
State challenged the only Black prospective juror on the first panel of twelve, and the
number of Black individuals in the jury pool was small. See id. at 714-15, 616 S.E.2d at
521-22. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered the challenged
prospective juror's responses on voir dire to be relevant circumstances negating an
inference of discrimination, see id. at 716, 616 S.E.2d at 522, rather than putting the burden
of rebutting that inference on the state as required by Miller-El II. See supra note 78-79
and accompanying text.
175. Note that many critics believe that the only way to eliminate racial discrimination
in jury selection is to ban peremptory challenges altogether. See Albert W. Alschuler, The
Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges and the Review of Jury
Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 209 (1989); Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final
Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517, 564 (1992);
Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial
Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal
Protection), 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1026, 1039 (1987). As Justice Marshall argued in his
concurrence in Batson, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105-07 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring), and Justice Breyer in his concurrence in Miller-El II twenty years later, see
Miller-El H1, 125 S. Ct. at 2340-44 (Breyer, J., concurring), the great difficulty of sorting
the wheat from the chaff in prosecutors' proffered reasons for peremptory challenges
means that some discrimination will ultimately still elude even the most watchful eyes of
the courts. Justice Marshall put it aptly, stating, "The inherent potential of peremptory
challenges to distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial
grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice
system." Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring).

